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JUSTICE FOR THE JUVENILE: THE DECISION
TO ARREST AND DUE PROCESS
SAMUEL M. DAVIS*
THE EMERGING JUVENILE PROCESS
Although the courts have devoted an enormous amount of'
scholarly energy "constitutionalizing" the criminal process,
comparatively little attention has been focused on the procedures
employed in the system of juvenile justice. Where the courts have been
concerned with the juvenile process, moreover, it has been from the
point of view of assuring "fairness" in the procedure rather than
extending to juveniles the same constitutional protections accorded
adults.
Application of less than constitutional standards to the juvenile
process had its basis in the premise that juvenile proceedings were
civil and not criminal in nature.' Thus, during a child's minority a
juvenile court could deprive him of his liberty without the same
protections assured an accused in a criminal prosecution. The loss
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I. See, e.g., the discussion in In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 126-28, 96 P. 563, 564-65 (1908).
For a more recent reiteration of the same premise, see In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 192, 407
P.2d 760,768 (1965), rev'd, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
of liberty was comparable; the constitutional safeguards were not. 2
This differentiation of treatment was justified under the benign
sanction of parens patriae3-the state representing not only the
interests of society but the interests of the child as well. Instead of
relying on the adversary proceeding, the juvenile court relied upon
application of the tools of the social sciences in an effort to protect
children, to diagnose their problems, and to "help" rather than
punish them. The state's role was changed from that of aggressor
and adversary to that of benevolent benefactor.4 Such a solicitous,
nonadversary setting had "little need" for constitutional safeguards.
Indeed, one of the supporting goals of the juvenile court movement
,was to remove the youth from the combative arena of the criminal
court with its procedural.formality and stigmatic atmosphere, thereby
sparing him the rigor, harshness and public exposure of a criminal
trial. The juvenile court scheme was viewed as providing a higher form
of justice than could be attained in a criminal court.5
2. Paulsen 549. By way of illustrating the attention that courts have paid to rhetoric while
disregarding reality, the best analogue comes from Mark Twain. Ken Vinson tells it best:
Huckleberry Finn's uniformed lay mind thought pickaxes were best for digging under
the cabin where Jim was trapped. Tom Sawyer knew better; he called for case-knives
(table knives): "It don't make no difference how foolish it is, it's the right way-and
it's the regular way. And there ain't no other way that I ever heard of, and I've read
all the books that gives any information about these things. They always dig out with
a case-knife."
Hours later, blisters and impatience rising, a light came to Tom's legal mind. He
dropped his knife and in a magisterial voice commanded Huck, "Gimme a case-knilfe."
Huck tells the rest:
"He had his own by him, but I handed him mine. He flung it down and says,
'Gimme a case-knife.' I don't know just what to do-but then I thought. I scratched
around amongst the old tools and got a pickaxe and give it to him, and he took it
and went to work and never said a word. He was always just that particular. Full of
principle."
Vinson, Torts in a Devil's Nutshell, 21 J. LEo. ED. 430, 431-32 (1969). The incident is taken
from M. TwAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (1884).
3. A. PTrr, THE CHILD SAVERS 137 (1969). Almost all of the older cases dealing with
juvenile matters endorse the concept of parens patriae-the parental relationship of the state
to the child. The discussion in In re Sharpe, 15 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908), is typical, as is
the historical discussion in the more recent case of State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d
21 (1954). See also District of Columbia v. Jackson, 261 A.2d 511 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970).
4. Alexander, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, in JUsTIcE 82, 84-85.
5. "whereas criminal courts exist to convict and dispose of guilty adults, juvenile courts
exist to protect and correct delinquent children." Id. at 87-88. The language of the Arizona
Supreme Court in Gault reflects the same sentiment:
[J]uvenile courts do not exist to punish children for their transgressions against
society. The juvenile court stands in the position of a protecting parent rather than a
prosecutor. It is an effort to substitute protection and guidance for punishment, to
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The juvenile court movement, thus meant a diminution of the civil
liberties and privacy of the young. The absence of procedural
formality and the heavy reliance on paralegal resources marked the
juvenile court, in this sense, as an antilegal movement. 6 This alone,
however, is not as damaging as the devastating fact that a delinquency
adjudication, on a youngster's level of knowledge understanding and
experience, carries" the game meaning afid sense- of social disappro-
bation that a criminal conviction carries to an adult 7-without
commensurate constitutional protection.8
Although strong feeling still exists in favor of continued reliance
on the state's benevolent role of a "protector" concerned with the
best interests of the child,9 juvenile court procedures have been the
target of considerable criticism"0 which continues to mount." While
recognizing a need for change, earlier critics were hesitant to advocate
conferring the trappings of the criminal process upon the juvenile
withdraw the child from criminal jurisdiction and use social sciences regarding the study
of human behavior which permit flexibilities within the procedures. The aim of the court
is to provide individualized justice for children. 99 Ariz. at 188,407 P.2d at 765.
6. A. PLAT-r, supra note 3, at 4, 141. "In short, this court aimed not to fight the delinquent
but to fight delinquency, and not with a legal bludgeon, but with knowledge, science, skill,
and devotion." Alexander, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE 82,85.
7. Tappan, Unofficial Delinquency, 29 NEB. L. REV. 547, 548 (1950). In brief, from the
youngster's point of view, there is no difference. Certainly substituting the label of "delinquency
proceeding" for "criminal prosecution" has no meaning for him. Justice Fortas, writing for
the Court in Gault said: "A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to
be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness
to a felony prosecution:' 387 U.S. at 36. Moreover, in discussing the application of the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, he said: "In the first place, juvenile
proceedings to determine 'delinquency,' which may lead to commitment to a state institution,
must be regarded as 'criminal' for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. To hold
otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-
of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings." 387 U.S. at 49-50. See also
Winburn v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966). Empirical studies are available
that recount very thoroughly the problem of stigmatization and the tendency of an
institutionalized youth to adopt the values and attitudes of a "prison" subculture. See Baum
& Wheeler, Becoming an Inmate, in CONTROLLING DELINQUENTS 153; Maher, The Delinquent's
Perception of the Law and the Community, in CONTROLLING DELUNQUENTS 187.
8. Paulsen 549.
9. For a relevant discussion of the competing attitudes, see Judge Musmanno's dissent in
In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 610, 109 A.2d 523, 528 (1954). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 375-76 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
10. Paulsen 547. By this phrase Monrad Paulsen aptly captured the dynamics of what was
happening in the juvenile court movement. But what in 1957 was a fair statement has become
in 1971-indeed, in the post-Gault years-a gross understatement.
I1. For more current criticisms see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-31 (1967); TASK FORCE
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 29.
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courts. They suggested, rather, the application of traditional,
fundamental notions of fairness and due process.' 2 The courts at first
agreed with this functional approach. In Kent v. United States,'3 for
example, the Supreme Court stated that although it did not hold that
a juvenile hearing "must conform with all of the requirements of a
criminal trial . . . the hearing must measure up to the essentials of
due process and fair treatment,"' 14 which were apparently to be
"determined from the requirements of due process and fair treatment,
and not by the direct application of the clauses of the Constitution
which. . . apply to criminal cases."' 5
More recently the Court has placed requisite fairness and due
process squarely on the fourteenth amendment, using the provisions
of the Bill of Rights as a reference point for determining the
requirements of due process. In deciding In re Gault,"6 for example,
the Court reiterated the view taken in Kent but went on to say that
the "essentials of due process and fair treatment" standard was "a
requirement which is part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'" Similarly, the Court has held that proof beyond a
12. "Fairness.is a relative standard. The proper inquiry is: what does fairness require in
a children's court case?" Paulsen 550. On this point Judge Alexander agrees: "If all that is
wanted is simply justice, it could just as well be meted out to children in any conventional
court. The juvenile court was not created to administer justice to children; it was meant...
to safeguard their supraconstitutional rights. . . "' which include "there social, moral, mental,
physical, economic, ethical, and all their natural rights.' Alexander, Constitutional Rights In
the Juvenile Court, in JusricE 82, 88,90.
13. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
14. Id. at 562.
15. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (cited in Kent, 383 U.S. at
562).
16. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Id. at 30-31. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, would have fashioned the fourteenth
amendment test along a more fundamental design: "Among the first premises of our
constitutional system is the obligation to conduct any proceeding in which an individual may
be deprived of liberty or property in a fashion consistent with the 'traditions and conscience
of our people.'" Id. at 67. With this in mind, he said, the Court's task was to "measure the
requirements of due process by reference bpth to the problems which confront the State and
to the actual character of the procedural system which the State has created." Id. at 68. The
sources for making such a determination are three-fold: "first, the 'settled usages and modes
of proceeding' . . . ; second, the 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions' ... ; and third, the character and
requirements of the circumstances presented in each situation." Id. Based on "fair distillations
of relevant judicial history," his test did not use the Bill of Rights provisions as a reference
point for determining the essentials of due process, a method of analysis that Justice Black
found extremely upsetting. Id. at 61-64.
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reasonable doubt was required in a delinquency proceeding and is
likewise grounded in the fourteenth amendment. 18
There appears, then, to be a trend away from the idea that all
that is required in the juvenile process is a general standard of fairness
toward a view that the requirements of fairness and due process, with
specific reference to the Bill of Rights, are made necessary by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 9 This has resulted
in an expanding, evolving bag of constitutional rights being accorded
to juveniles.
The fountainhead of this movement, of course, was the Gault case,
according juveniles the right to counsel, the right to timely and
adequate notice of the charges being brought, the privilege against
self-incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against them. 20 Many areas of the juvenile process,
intentionally and by the terms of the opinion were, however, left
untouched by the Gault decision, leaving the states and federal
agencies a great deal of flexibility and initiative.to bring procedures
into line with the spirit of the decision.2' Many courts have read Gault
to require a great deal more than its mandate. A number, for ex-
ample, have held that Miranda 2 warnings must be given to juveniles
18. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Paradoxically, Winship represents in a sense a
return to Justice Harlan's natural law concept of due process, because, as Justice Black points
out, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not to be found in the Bill of Rights
and, therefore, is not made operable by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 377. Black's dissent
in Winship is a logical, if problematical, consequence of his feeling expressed in Gault that
due process means the "law of the land," which in the Gault context he translated as the Bill
of Rights. He felt that the particular rights granted in Gault were required by the specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights, and only to the extent that the fourteenth amendment made
these provisions mandatory upon the states was it relevant. 387 U.S. at 61, 64. To Justice
Black it follows naturally that if a particular right is not a requirement of the Bill of Rights,
the Court cannot make it so by relying upon the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
standing alone. The paradox of Winship is that it requires, on the basis of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile
proceedings involving a violation of criminal law, but it does so without using the Bill of Rights
as a reference point.
19. But cf. note 18 supra. In addition, one should note the Supreme Court's decision in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), in which the Court held that the right to
jury trial was inapplicable to state juvenile proceedings. This represents the first major set-
back of the post-Gault era.
20. 387 U.S. at 31-56.
21. Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault. Revolutionary Requirements and Reappraisal, 53 VA.
L. REv. 1700, 1706-07 (1967). The Court in Gault very carefully delimited the scope of its
decision: "We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provisions
upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do not even consider
the entire process relating to juvenile 'delinquents."' 387 U.S. at 13.
22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467-73 (1966).
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before any questioning may take place.21 Although the Supreme
Court ruled in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania2' that the Constitution does
not require states to provide a jury trial in juvenile proceedings,
some jurisdictions have said, either by statute or court decision, that
23. See. e.g., In re Creek, 243 A.2d 49 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); In re Aaron D., 30 App.
Div. 2d 183, 290 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1968); Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1968).
24. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). The Court earlier had been confronted with the issue in DeBacker
v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969), but because that proceeding was held prior to the decision
in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which applied the sixth amendment right to
jury trial to the states through the fourteenth amendment, the Court did not decide the question.
The Court already had declared in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), that Duncan
would not receive retroactive application.
The decision in McKeiver, however, comes as no surprise. Prior to its announcement, the
only two members of the Court who could be counted as solidly supporting the right to trial
by jury for juveniles were Justices Black and Douglas. Both would have reached the merits in
De Backer and would have held that the sixth and fourteenth amendments compel a jury trial
in juvenile proceedings in which the delinquent act charged is one that would be criminal if
committed by an adult. 396 U.S. at 33-38. In reference to the rights granted juveniles in In
re Gault, Justice Black said: "I can see no basis whatsoever in the language of the Constitution
for allowing persons like appellant the benefit of those rights and yet denying them a jury
trial, a right which is surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the English-
speaking world." 396 U.S. at 34.
Justice Black's belief that the sixth amendment right to jury trial is applicable to juvenile
proceedings was a further extension of his notion that the rights conferred in Gault were required
by the fifth and sixth amendments as made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth
amendment, and not by any vague standard of fairness and due process. In the Gault case,
he said: "Where a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged and convicted
for violating a state criminal law, and then ordered by the State to be confined for six years,
I think the Constitution requires that he be tried in accordance with the guarantees of all the
provisions of the Bill of Rights made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."
387 U.S. at 61 (emphasis added). The only significance to him of the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause, relied upon by the majority in Gault, was that "it would, of course, violate
due process or the 'law of the land' to enforce a law that collides with the Bill of Rights."
387 U.S. at 64.
While the Court has lost Chief Justice Warren and Justices Fortas and Black, critics of
juvenile activism have remained on the Court and have been strengthened by the addition of
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Chief Justice Burger revealed his feelings in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375-76 (1970) (dissenting opinion), and Justice Blackmun has now
evidenced his leanings by writing the Court's opinion in McKeiver.
Justice Stewart's credentials as an opponent of the expanding role of the Constitution in
the juvenile process go back even further. See his dissenting opinion in Gault. 387 U.S. at
78-81 (1967). Justice Harlan had given previous indications that he could not be relied upon
to support the right to jury trial for juveniles. In Gault he voiced opposition to any requirement
that might "radically alter the character of the juvenile court proceedings." Such requirements,
he said, "would contribute materially to the creation in these proceedings of the atmosphere
of an ordinary criminal trial, and would, even if they do no more, thereby largely frustrate a
central purpose of these specialized courts." 387 U.S. at 75. Elaborating on this in Winshlp,
he intimated disfavor with any action that would, inter alia, "burden the juvenile courts with
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the right is applicable to juvenile proceedings and must be protected.25
Several courts have also found, in essence, that a delinquency pro-
ceeding is tantamount to a trial; juveniles therefore have the right not
to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense.26 More recently
the Supreme Court has held that the standard of proof required in
juvenile delinquency proceedings is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, z  although some state courts had already reached this result2
a procedural requirement that will make juvenile adjudications significantly more time
consuming or rigid." 397 U.S. at 375.
By the time the Court decided the jury question, the forces were already deployed and a
few skirmishes had taken place. The campaign oratory was over. All that remained was the
inevitable counting of the votes.
25. See. e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1110 (Supp. 1970-71). See also Nieves v. United
States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 269 N.E.2d 277 (Mass.
1971); Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968); In re McCloud, 8 CRIM. L. REP.
2340 (R.I. Fam. Ct. Jan. 15, 1971). Of the four cases mentioned only In re McCloud deals
directly with the sixth amendment right to trial by jury, holding it applicable to juvenile
proceedings. The Massachusetts and New Mexico decisions are based on local statutory law.
Nieves involved the consitutionality of waiver of the right to trial by jury. Under federal law
the juvenile had a right to trial by jury, but in order to exercise that right, he would have had
to elect to be tried as an adult. Election to be tried as a juvenile under the provisions of the
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 5033, 62 Stat. 857, would
have operated as a waiver of the sixth amendment right. The three-judge panel held that this
imposed a constitutionally impermissible choice on the juvenile and declared § 5033
unconstitutional insofar as it compelled him to make such a choice. Furthermore, the court
held that if the juvenile thereafter elected to be tried as a juvenile, he would have to be afforded
the right to a jury trial. The Act has been amended to conform with the mandate of Nieves.
18 U.S.C. § 533 (1970).
Nothing said in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania changes the above. McKeiver merely said that
the right to a jury trial is not one of those rights made obligatory upon the states by the
fourteenth amendment assessment of due process, the test announced in Gault. This does not
prevent the states from affording such a right if they feel compelled, for constitutional or other
reasons, to do so.
The great majority of states that have passed on the question, however, have rejected the
notion that the right to jury trial is applicable to juvenile proceedings. See. e.g., Robinson v.
State, 227 Ga. 140, 179 S.E.2d 248 (1971); In re Fucini, 44 Iil. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970),
appeal dismissed, 403 U.S. 925 (1971); Bible v. State, 254 N.E.2d 319 (Ind. 1970); Dryden
v. Commonwealth, 435 S.V.2d 457 (Ky. 1968); In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 255 A.2d 419
(1969); In re J.W., 57 N.J. 144, 270 A.2d 273 (1970); In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d
879 (1969), aff-d, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Daniel D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627, 313
N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970); In re Agler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969); In reTurner, 253
Ore. 235, 453 P.2d 910 (1969); In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970), affd sub nom.,
MeKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Estes, 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205
(1968).
26. See, e.g., Hultin v. Beto, 396 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968); Sawyer v. Hauck, 245 F. Supp.
55 (W.D. Tex. 1965); Richard M. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 752 (1971); Tolliver v. Judges of the Family Court, 59 Misc. 2d 104, 298 N.Y.S.2d 237
(Sup. Ct. 1969); Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1968).
27. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
28. Thomas v. State, 121 Ga. App. 91, 172 S.E.2d 860 (1970); In re Urbasek, 38 111. 2d
535,232 N.E.2d 716 (1967); People v. Archie, 105 111. App.2d 211,245 N.E.2d 59 (1969).
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and one state had enacted a statute incorporating the reasonable
doubt standard in juvenile proceedings.29
The above enumeration is illustrative and not exclusive or
exhaustive of the emerging "constitutionalized" juvenile process.
Today there can be no doubt that the juvenile court is a miniature
criminal court-as it has been disparagingly described 3 -although
this ought to be accepted without an abjuration of the entire juvenile
court movement.31
Thus, the trend evidenced by Gault and its progeny has been
marked by a "tendency of these doctrines to push on to their logical
conclusion." 32 What their logical conclusion is, of course, would
require the exploration of the whole breadth of juvenile law, and the
answer could never be too precise, because, like an amoeba, it is
constantly changing shape and growing in size and complexity as the
constitutional issues are analyzed and articulated. The purpose of this
article, therefore, is to examine only one-though crucial-part of
the whole: the power of the police to intervene in the lives and conduct
of youth, to take them into custody, and the means of protecting a
juvenile's rights-including a determination of what those rights
are-if he is taken into custody.
THE POLICE AND JUVENILE CUSTODY
The Decision to Take a Youth into Custody
The decision to invoke the criminal process by arresting someone
is not a mechanical procedure, but rather involves a complicated,
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-6 (1969).
30. Hennings, Effectiveness of the Juvenile Court System, 23 FED. PROB. 3, 7 (1959).
31. For support of the notion that the Court in its overzealous activism has swallowed
the last vestige of the philosophy of the juvenile court, see Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
Winship. 397 U.S. at 375-76. Gault, however, supports the countervailing notion that the
juvenile court philosophy and constitutional rights traditionally denied application in the
juvenile court are compatible: "As we shall discuss, the observance of due process standards,
intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace
any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process." 387 U.S. at 21. And again: "We do
not mean by this to denigrate the juvenile court process or to suggest that there are not aspects
of the juvenile system relating to offenders which are valuable. But the features of the juvenile
system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by
constitutional domestication." Id. at 22.
32. W. SCHAEFER, THE SusPEcT AND SOCIETY 27 (1967). Judge Schaefer was referring to
new constitutional doctrines that impinge upon police investigation in criminal cases, but his
remarks seem analogous to a similar phenomenon occuring in the juvenile process. The logical
flow of the Gault rationale appears to have been slowed, however, by the Supreme Court's
decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (197 1).
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though informal and perhaps unconscious, policy-making process.
The police officer must assimilate, often quickly and under pressure,
what conduct is in fact criminal, the seriousness of the incident, and
the appropriate response. The complexity of the process is
compounded when dealing with juveniles, since to the existing morass
is added a great deal of uncertainty concerning the proper role of
the police in handling juveniles,33 for which the great majority of
jurisdictions in this country make no special provision.1 Traditional
limitations placed on police dealing with adults suspected of
crime-in particular, that there be sufficient knowledge in the
possession of the officer that would justify his interference-have not
been the concern of officers handling juveniles. The concern rather
has been to "protect" the youth and to instill in him respect for law
enforcement. 35 In addition, because juvenile proceedings are not
regarded as criminal in nature, the police exercise considerably more
discretion in dealing with juveniles than is exercised with adults.3
The continued reliance on the parens patriae concept has led most
police officers to conclude that the limitations placed on them in the
investigation of adult crimes do not apply in the investigation of youth
offenses37 which makes encounters between youth and the police a
33. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 13-14 (1967).
34. See Luger, The Youthful Offender, in TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
119, 121.
35. REMINGTON 959. Again, all of the old and a number of the more recent cases emphasize
the "protective" rather than punitive nature of the juvenile process. See, e.g., State v. Monahan,
15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954), in which the court quotes from the case of In re Morin, 95
N.H. 518, 520, 68 A.2d 668, 670 (1949), saying: "We think it sufficiently plain that the act
in question is designed to permit the exercise of the powers of state as 'parens patriae,' for
the purpose of rehabilitating minor children, and not of punishing them for the commission
of a crime. 'It is generally held that the purpose of such statutes is not penal, but protective:"
15 N.J. at 38, 104 A.2d at 23.
36. Wilson, The Police and the Delinquent in Two Cities, in CONTROLLING DELINQUENTS
9, 10. For an analytic treatment of the whole area of police discretion, see Tieger, Police
Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1971 DUKE L.J. 717 and Ferster & Courtless 575-
83.
37. REMINGTON 969. Indeed, this belief has been fostered to some extent in the courts, In
re James L., Jr., 25 Ohio Op. 2d 369, 194 N.E.2d 797 (Cuyahoga County Juv. Ct. 1963),
and in the legislative position that taking a juvenile into custody does not amount to an arrest.
See, e.g., JUVENILE Act § 16; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-1(3) (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260.165 (1971); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.31 (Page Supp. 1970); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 48.28(2) (1957). See also Ferster & Courtless 583-89. However, the scope of the Gault
decision is still expanding, see notes 21-32supra, and it is too soon to conclude how far-reaching
the impact of Gault will be. With the extension of Gault's mandate into the investigatory stages
of juvenile proceedings, vis-a-vis the Miranda requirements, see note 23 supra, law enforcement
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crucial stage of the juvenile process. A minor's initial contact with
the juvenile justice system is with the police and it sets in motion
forces of informal decision making that may determine whether he
is to be entangled in the net of the juvenile process. In many cases
he has been caught violating the law or is being sought in connection
with a particular crime, but many instances occur wherein no
particular act has been committed-that is, the policeman's sixth
sense tells him that something is amiss.3" In such instances, the officer
can respond in a number of ways. He can do nothing; he can stop
and ask the juveniles their names, their addresses, and their
destination; he can search and order them to disperse; he can send
or take them home and warn their parents to keep them off the street;
or, he may take them to the station for further questioning or
checking.39
An officer's response to a street situation may be regulated to
some degree by departmental practice, which may be either expressly
or tacitly un-erstood, 4 but is also affected by more subtle factors.
Suspecting that something has happened or is about to happen, but
officers apparently will apply to juveniles the same standards relating to the law or arrest that
are now applied in the case of adults. The most that can be said now is that police are uncertain
about what is required of them in taking a juvenile into custody. Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-
1301(b) (1971) which provides that taking a juvenile into custody is not deemed an arrest
"except for the purpose of determining its validity under the Constitution of this State or of
the United States." This seems to imply that the law of arrest shall apply to juveniles in the
same manner in which it is applicable to adults.
38. COMMUSSION REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 78. See also R. MAClVER, TiE
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF DELINQUENCY 139 (1966).
39. COMMISSiON REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 78.
40. Id. Police response to on-the-street juvenile situations varies greatly from one
department to the next. Swanson 361. The degree of discretion exercised depends to a large
extent on the characterization of the department in terms of departmental policy, attitudes,
and philosophy. A comparison of two departments-one a large eastern department
characterized as a "fraternal" department, and the other a large western department,
characterized as a "professional" department-revealed that the highly professional
department exercised less discretion and responded to juvenile problems with greater formality
(i.e., more arrests and more referrals to juvenile court), whereas the fraternal department
exercised far more discretion and tended to dispose of many juvenile matters without any further
official action or referral to juvenile court or any other agency. The professional department
was described as "one governed by values derived from general, impersonal rules which bind
all members of the organization and whose relevance is independent of circumstances of time,
place or personality." On the other hand, the nonprofessional or fraternal department was
described as one that "relies to a greater extent on particularisticjudgments-that is, judgments
based on the significance to a particular person of his particular relations to particular others."
Wilson, The Police and the Delinquent in Two Cities, in CONTROLLING DELINQUENTs 10-12.
See also J WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 111-18, 217-18 (1968).
[Vol. 1971:913
JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES
with nothing concrete upon which to select a course of action, he may
be guided by his subjective attitudes toward, for example, members
of a particular race, length of hair, style of clothes, or other qualities
of appearance, as well as the reaction and attitude of the juvenile
himself-whether he is cooperative and respectful or impudent,
defiant or indifferent.41 In the absence of any "legal" basis, reticence
or equivocation on the part of the youth may well be the basis of
an arrest.42
In street encounters there may be a convergance of conflicting
attitudes. Police officers, for example, view as essential to effective
law enforcement the power to stop persons on the street, to ask
questions, and if the occasion seems to require it, to detain them for
further questioning.4 3 The officer on the street may also view his job
as maintaining order and the established routine. Anything that
appears to be a departure from the routine gives cause for suspicion
and the officer is likely to intervene. If the officer's authority is
questioned, moreover, this may manifest to him another departure
from the routine and a threat to established order. Such a challenge
may be met with a rather severe response.44
A youth usually has preexisting attitudes toward the police that
will be confirmed or changed by his initial encounter with a police
officer. Much, therefore, may depend upon the attitude of the officer
himself-whether it evokes respect or antagonism. The interaction of
these attitudes may determine whether the child will be taken into
custody or released.45
Juveniles possess unique characteristics that demand a specialized
form of handling. 6 Youth are very impressionable, and when they
41. COMMISSION REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIWE 78; Ferster & Courtless 578-79. See
generally Comment, Soco-Legal Aspects of Racially Motivated Police Misconduct, 1971 DUKE
L.J. 751.
42. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, supra note 33, at 186.
43. CoM mssioN REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 93. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). See also In re Lang, 44 Misc. 2d 900, 255
N.Y.S.2d 987 (Fam. Ct. 1965).
44. P. CHEViGNY, POLICE POWER 276 (1969). The policeman exercises an authoritative
function: "He suppresses crime, apprehends offenders, and preserves the public peace. He
protects the rights of the individual. He sets the tone of law enforcement for the area he patrols."
Swanson 362. He therefore regards any challenge to his exercise of this function as a serious
matter. See J. WILSON, supra note 40, at 217.
45. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, STANDARDS AND GUIDES FOR THE
DETENTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH 23 (1961).
46. Luger, The Youthful Offender, in TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 120-
Vol. 1971:913]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
first encounter the juvenile justice system they may feel all alone and
view the police, as well as other forms of authority, as demanding,
judgmental and perhaps hostile. 4 The young, because they are
especially vulnerable to influence, however slight, must be handled
with a great deal more circumspection and understanding than an
adult offender. It is important that the impression of the
administration of justice that minors get at this point be one of
fairness, for if this impression is formed, the process of rehabilitation
has already commenced." Otherwise, he may be imbued with a
disrespect for lawful authority and a sense of bitter resentment for
the system of justice.49 The concern for the consequences flowing from
the encounter between the youth and police is thus justified. Implicit
in this concern, however, is the officer's view of himself as a vital,
functioning part of the rehabilitative process.5"
The Jurisdictional Basis for Taking a Youth into Custody
Too little attention has been paid to the relationship between state
power and individual liberty where the juvenile is concerned. The
relationship is crucial because, given the protective role of the juvenile
court, when authority is exercised to do something for a youth,
something must be done to him as well. 51
One of the characteristics of the juvenile justice system is that the
scope of its jurisdiction, derived from the original scheme of the
juvenile court concept, is very broad-to take in all youths in need
of help, for whatever reason. Discarding momentarily the area of
neglect and dependency jurisdiction, the broad jurisdictional scope
includes not only the area of conduct which if committed by an adult
would be criminal, but also a rather large area of other, more general,
youthful misbehavior. The intake of a typical juvenile court includes
all sorts of youths who are in trouble, although the "trouble" may
consist simply of youthful criminality-that is, conduct which society
deems unlawful when engaged in by youth, but not when committed
by adults-truancy, or something less serious. Such an approach
seeks to enforce the criminal code as well as a more general code of
47. Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 585, 595 (1965).
48. Paulsen 551. See also R. MACIVER, supra note 38, at 139-40; Swanson 361-62.
49. S. WHEELER & L. COTTRELL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 33 (1966). See also CozmulISSION
REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 79.
50. REMINGTON 959.
51. Paulsen, The Expanding Horizons of Legal Services-I, 67 W. VA. L. REV. 267, 269
(1965). See also J. KENNY & D. PURSUIT, POLICE WORK WITH JUVENILES 47 (3d ed. 1965).
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juvenile conduct which embraces duties owed by youth both to
parents and school authorities. Enforcement of a more general code
of behavior was marked by the advent of the "incorrigibility"
status-wherein if the youth exhibits such an attitude of defiance that
he cannot be controlled by his parents or school authorities, the
juvenile court may intervene in situations amounting to something
less than the violation of criminal laws. 52
Perhaps the powers of police to intervene in the conduct of
juveniles ought to be broader than it is in the case of adults. Perhaps
an officer should be able to take a juvenile into custody when he
reasonably believes that the child is delinquent or in need of help or
supervision for whatever reason; otherwise, the police may be
powerless to act in situations where their knowledge indicates that a
child is delinquent but falls short of knowledge sufficient to show a
violation of law. Viewed in this light, broad authority is necessary
for the protection of youth and is not necessarily a measure for
abrogating their rights. However, even if the police should have this
power, the circumstances under which a youth is taken into custody
in the first place must be a major area of concern, particularly in
light of the need to inquire into the relationship between state power
and individual liberty. As noted, most officers do not think that
limitations placed on their dealings with adults are applicable when
handling juveniles.5 Indeed, this is consistent with the notion that a
juvenile is not "arrested," but is "taken into custody" which implies
a protective and not punitive form of detention. 55
52. TASK FoRcE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 22. Most "incorrigibility" statutes are
similar to New York's:
"Person in need of supervision" means a male less than sixteen years of age and a
female less than eighteen years of age who does not attend school in accord with the
provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education law or who is incorrigible,
ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other
lawful authority. N.Y. FAhi. CT. AcT § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970-71).
For a discussion of the varying police role in the different jurisdictional contexts, see Ferster
& Courtless 584-89.
53. Implicit in this suggestion, of course, is a new definitional concept of "delinquency."
Traditionally, delinquency included all forms of juvenile behavior that were regarded as
undesirable, including what otherwise would be criminal conduct, incorrigibility, truancy,
running away from home, and being in need of supervision. See, e.g., Miss. CODE
ANN. § 7185-02 (g) (Supp. 1970). More recent formulations, however, have limited
"delinquent" conduct to violations of local, state, or federal laws and have placed all of the
other forms of conduct mentioned above in the category of "persons in need of supervision."
See, e.g., CAL. WVELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 601, 602 (Vest 1966).
54. See note 37 supra.
55. See, e.g., JUVENILE Ac § 16; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-1(3) (Supp. 1971); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.165 (1971); Ono REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.31 (Page Supp. 1970); Wis.
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The circumstances under which a youth may be taken into custody
are quite broad. The Standard Juvenile Court Act, for example,
provides that a child may be taken into custody when he violates a
law in the presence of the officer, when there are reasonable grounds
to believe that he has committed an act which if committed by an
adult would be a felony, when he is "seriously endangered in his
surroundings," and when there are reasonable grounds to believe that
he has run away from home." Exactly what circumstances would
indicate to a police officer that a child was "seriously endangered
in his surroundings" is not at all clear.
California has two statutes which, in addition to others, delimit
the juvenile jurisdiction, and provide a poignant example of the
problem. The first provides that any person under the age of twenty-
one who violates the law, or who fails to obey a lawful order of the
juvenile court, is within the jurisdiction of that court, which may
adjudge him to be its ward. 5 The second provides that one under
the age of twenty-one who habitually disobeys the proper orders of
his parents or guardian, or who is a truant, or "who from any cause
is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life," is
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.58 If any situation is more
tenuous than one in which a youth is "seriously endangered in his
surroundings" it is one in which the youth is "in danger of leading
an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life." This expression of concern,
even though founded on the worthy desire to protect the young from
themselves, takes in a great range of conduct-indeed, a large part
of the problem is that one meets difficulty in determining exactly what
conduct is included. Certainly if such language served as the basis
of a criminal conviction, it would be subject to a constitutionally
based vagueness challenge. 59
STAT. ANN. § 48.28(2) (1957), all of which provide that taking a juvenile into custody is not
deemed an arrest. Ferster & Courtless, who have conducted considerable research in this area,
relate that some thirty-six jurisdictions employ the substituted phraseology. Ferster & Courtless
583-84 & n.76. Of these thirty-six, fifteen specifically state that taking a juvenile into custody
does not constitute an arrest. Id. at 5S4 & n.77.
56. JUVE ILE ACT § 16. See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2309 (1970 D.C. Code Leg. &
Ad. Serv. 89).
57. CAL. AVELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602 (1966).
58. Id. § 601.
59. Paulsen 556. Paulsen has more recently suggested, however, that the definitions are
vague because the conduct they seek to describe is vague. The standard for measuring such
conduct, he says, "does not admit of a more certain formulation." Paulsen, The Delinquency,
Neglect, and Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, in JUsTICE 50. See also Dorsen
[Vol. 1971:913
JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES
Vagueness, however, is not the only problem of this type of
statute. In In re Daniel R.,10 for example, a California juvenile court
found that a sixteen year old boy who admitted having sold marijuana
was in danger of leading a "dissolute life." Although this decision
was reversed for lack of sufficient evidence, the appellate court
expressed no concern over the fact that the juvenile had been taken
into custody with neither warrant nor probable cause.', This is
precisely the type of case that leads police officers to believe that the
usual limitations inherent in the handling of adult offenses do not
apply when they are dealing with juveniles. The broad jurisdictional
power allows officers to take juveniles into custody for criminal law
violations under circumstances in which they would not be permitted
to arrest adults. In a case such as In re Daniel R., the police, in the
absence of reasonable grounds to believe that the youth had
committed a criminal offense, could rely instead on the much broader
"protective" jurisdiction that permits a youth to be taken into
custody where he is "seriously endangered in his surroundings" or
is "in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life."
This is not to say that the broad grant of jurisdiction is improper
per se. Many young people are in need of help for reasons that fall
short of criminal behavior, and their problems ought to be brought
to someone's attention. But when juxtaposing state power with
individual liberty, more precision is required than is found in the
description of a youth as being "in danger of leading an idle,
dissolute, lewd, or immoral life."
The problem is compounded, moreover, by the fact that most
youths are undoubtedly taken into custody without a warrant,
normally when they are caught in the act of committiig an offense
or when an officer observes circumstances that seem to require such
action.62 Because the decision to take a youth into custody is primarily
a police decision, the disparity between the handling of adults and
juveniles is perhaps greatest at this point. 3 Admittedly, a police
& Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future Juvenile Law, I FAM. L.Q. 1, 33 (1967). In fact, however,
the language in section 601 was held to be unconstitutional in Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424
(N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), excerpted in 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 45.
60. Unreported (Orange County Super. Ct., Nov. 5, 1968).
61. 274 Cal. App. 2d 749,754,79 Cal. Rptr. 247,250 (1969).
62. F. SUSSMAN, LA-w OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 33 (3d ed. F. Baum 1968).
63. REMINGTON 972. Despite the fact that most arrests are made without warrant, the
criminal law indicates a clear preference for the detached judgment of a magistrate rather than
the subjective judgment of the policeman on the beat. See Giordenello v. United States, 357
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officer ought to possess the flexibility of authority to take
someone-adult or juvenile-into custody when he has a reasonable
belief that the person has violated a law; but whether he-should have
the same power where more subtle decisions are involved-such as
whether a child is "in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or
immoral life"-is highly questionable.
The protective aura that surrounds the whole juvenile court
philosophy-the spirit of parens patriae-is not so benevolent,
however, that it can embrace at the same time the best interests of
the child on the one hand and the denial of precious rights on the
other. One writer has observed that our system of justice cannot
accommodate a disparity in the rights accorded to two classes of
people-adults and children-on the basis of labels that we attach
to each.64 Yet he would still grant to police broader power to take
youths into custody than that permitted in the case of adults, because
otherwise the police would be without authority to intervene in a
situation where their knowledge indicates that a child is delinquent,
but falls short of knowledge sufficient to show a violation of law.
This is desirable as a "protective" measure and not as a measure
for depriving juveniles of their rights.6 s The existence of such power,
however, enables the police, as in Daniel R., to take a juvenile into
custody for what ultimately amounts to a criminal violation, while
relying, in the absence of the requisite reasonable cause, on a statute
that grants the power to take a youth into custody where he is in
danger of leading a "dissolute life."66
U.S. 480,486-87 (1958). The requirement of a warrant isasafeguard that is by-passed whenever
an arrest without warrant is made. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). This is not to say
that arresting without a warrant is a reprehensible practice. The message imparted by the
criminal law is merely that a warrant ought to be obtained wherever practicable. Wherever
the circumstances permit a choice to be made, that choice ought to be exercised in favor of
obtaining a warrant, issuance of which is based on a magistrates impartial, objective judgment.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,479-80 (1963).
64. There is a relationship between the rights of a child and the treatment given him
by the juvenile court. If the result of an adjudication of delinquency is substantially
the same as a verdict of guilty, the youngster has been deprived of his constitutional
rights by false labeling. We cannot take away precious legal protection simply by
changing names from "criminal prosecution" to "delinquency proceedings," Paulsen
550.
65. Id. at 551. In this same vein Paulsen also adds: "[M]oreover, limiting delinquency to
violations of criminal law also involves resort to uncertainties. Consider 'disorderly conduct,'
'vagrancy,' 'disturbing the peace'--each a crime in spite of its lack of precision." Paulsen,
The Delinquency, Neglect, and Dependency Jurisdiction.of the Juvenile Court, in JUSTiCE 50-
51.
66. In re Daniel R., 274 Cal. App. 2d 822, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1969).
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Somewhere in this morass of conflicting ideals, arising out of
genuine concern for the juvenile's constitutional rights, personal
liberty, protection and general welfare, there ought to be a point
where a balance can be struck. Such a resolution is possible and
proceeds from the belief that the police ought to have broad powers
to take young people into custody. The danger inheres not in the
existence of the power itself, but in the manner in which it is exercised.
In brief, the power ought simply to be exercised with a great deal
more circumspection. Most states have statutes that allow police
officers to take juveniles into custody under circumstances where they
either are endangered by their surroundings or otherwise are
exhibiting moral dissolution. 7 These statutes indicate, as has already
been acknowledged, that the decision to take a youth into custody
is regarded as primarily a police decision; 8 however, should it be
solely a police decision when the broad jurisdictional power is invoked
to take into custody a youth who is "in danger of leading a dissolute
life?" Police officers generally are poorly equipped to make this sort
of decision, and the possibility of abuse is too hazardous to allow
them to exercise it without check. To be sure, juveniles in "trouble"
should get help, but someone other than the officer in the street ought
to assume the primary responsibility in the decision-making process.,
One such provision is contained in New York's juvenile
jurisdiction statute which provides that a person under the age of
sixteen may be taken into custody without a warrant only when he
is committing an act which, if performed by an adult, would justify
an arrest. 70 Thus, the statute does not authorize custodial detention
of a juvenile on the ground that he is in need of supervision, because
67. The District of Columbia, for example, makes the following provision in its code:
A child may be taken into custody-
(3) by a law enforcement officer when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the
child is suffering from illness or injury or is in immediate danger from his surroundings,
and that his removal from his surroundings is necessary ...
* * **D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2309 (1970 D.C. Code Leg. & Ad. Serv. 89).
See also JUVENILE ACT § 16; CAL. VELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West 1966); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260.165 (1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.31 (Page Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.28 (Supp. 1971-72).
68. See note 63 supra.
69. The exercise of responsibility here ought to be genuine, rather than the sort of "rubber
stamp" authorization by magistrates that commonly occurs in the criminal process.
70. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 721 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71) (Family Court Act).
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in such situations "there is no such urgency that the matter may not
be dealt with initially by summons."'7
New York does recognize that juveniles need protection in
situations involving less than criminal behavior, but its approach
differs from that of most states. Without a warrant or summons a
policeman on the beat and lodging it with the juvenile court judge
decision that the youth requires supervision. If the youth is to be taken
into custody, the officer must obtain a summons from a judicial
authority and must, presumably, present to that authority the facts
supporting his belief that the minor requires supervision.
As the Committee Comment to the New York statute explains,
no situation in which a youth requires supervision is so compelling
that it cannot be handled through use of a summons.72 This provides
a practical, workable approach, removing the decision from the
policeman on beat and lodging it with the juvenile court judge
who knows more about youth, youth problems, and the realities of
the juvenile justice system and is better able to assimilate this
knowledge and place it in a legal perspective. The criminal justice
system deemphasizes the competence of the police to weigh evidence
and make the on-the-street decision to arrest, substituting therefor
a warrant wherever possible." The juvenile process should demand
no less a standard. Requiring a summons to issue whenever protective
jurisdiction is to be invoked seems to be reasonable in light of the
gravity and sophistication of the decision to be made.74
Procedural Requirements at Other Stages of the Juvenile Custodial
Process-In Custody Treatment
Analysis of developments in other stages of the juvenile custodial
process amplifies the need for imposing stricter procedural
requirements on the decision to take a youth into custody. In terms
of protecting a juvenile's rights, the process that begins immediately
after a youth is taken into custody is perhaps an area of even greater
71. See the Committee Comment following N.Y. Judiciary Law § 721 (McKinney Supp.
1970-71).
72. Id.
73. See note 62supra.
74. Cases may arise, however, where the child's immediate safety is in peril, and in such
cases it may be necessary for the officer to act immediately to prevent harm from coming to
the child. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406 P.2d 208 (1965), where the officer
responded to the call of a babysitter who had discovered a five-year-old child lying on the
floor of a furnace room, her hands tied behind her back, her head under the hot water heater,
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concern than the custody decision. 75 The procedural aspects of the
juvenile process, including police investigation and interrogation, are
confusing to both children and their parents, whose reaction is
frequently one of bewilderment and wonder.7"
As has already been noted, most youths are taken into custody
without warrant or summons. 77 One immediate problem is whether
the youth should be released into the custody of his parents or held
for further investigation. Because children are often held at police
stations on suspicion or for investigation for indefinite periods of
time, some states, to alleviate the potential harm of unnecessary
detention, have followed the example set forth in the Standard
Juvenile Court Act 78 which provides that if a child is taken into
and blood on her face from what appeared to be strap marks. Section 16(c) of the Standard
Juvenile Court Act contains a somewhat vague provision that would permit the officer to
remove the child from his surroundings where he is faced with immediate danger. Even New
York has a statute that would permit emergency removal in such a case. N.Y. JUDICIARY
LAW § 1024 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71). In these instances the officer is acting out of concern
for the child's welfare, and there may be other situations that would evoke the same concern
and demand the same immediate response. But what is involved is a matter of degree, and
the officer initially is charged with determining the degree and electing a course of action.
Whenever practicable, however, he ought to obtain a warrant or summons, and the impartial
magistrate ought to be the one who determines the course of action to be taken.
75. See Paulsen 551.
76. Studt, The Client's Image of the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE 204-05.
77. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
78. F. SUSSMAN, supra note 61, at 33-34. See JUVENILE AcT § 16. The National Council
on Crime and Delinquency also has made recommendations to this effect. NArIONAL COUNCIL
ON CRlM AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 45, at 23-24.
New York's statute provides as follows:
(a) If a peace officer takes into custody under section seven hundred twenty-one
or if a person is delivered to him under section seven hundred twenty-three, the peace
officer shall immediately notify the parent or other person legally responsible for his
care, or the person with whom he is domiciled, that he has been taken into custody.
(b) After making every reasonable effort to give notice under paragraph (a), the
peace officer shall
C) release the child to the custody of his parent or other person legally
responsible for his care upon the written promise, without security, of the person
to whose custody the child is released that he will produce the child before the
family court in that county at a time and place specified in writing; or
Cii) forthwith and with all reasonable speed take the child directly, and
without his first being taken to the police station house, to the family court
located in the county in which the act occasioning the taking into custody
allegedly was done. . . ; or
(iii) take the child to a place designated by rules of court for the reception
of children.
(c) In the absence of special circumstances, the peace officer shall release the child
in accord with paragraph (b)(i).
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custody, with or without warrant, his parents or guardian shall be
notified immediately. The Act further provides that unless there is
some compelling reason why he should not be released, the youth
shall be released in parental custody upon a written promise to
produce him in court at the designated time.7 With these special
release provisions for juveniles and the emphasis on releasing them
into parental custody, bail for juveniles has not been a question of
immediate concern. It might be argued that bail should not be
accorded a youth as a matter of right, not due to characterization of
a juvenile proceeding as civil rather than criminal in nature, but be-
cause the youth may be in need of care and supervision that might
be denied him without proper inquiry into the conditions and environ-
ment into which he would be released.8 0 The expanding "constitu-
tionalization" of the juvenile process, on the other hand, may very
well include the right to release on bail to the extent that it is enjoyed
by adults.8'
Another problem arises where the police wish to detain a juvenile
for further questioning. Although a reading of the cases and litera-
ture following Gault revealed its inescapable impact on the rights
of juveniles during the investigatory stages, questions were inevitable
as a consequence of the Court's own. language.82 Did Gault, for
example, require police officers to give Miranda warnings to
juveniles? If not, should they do it anyway? What role, if any, were
parents to play during the investigatory stage? Many states answered
these and other questions by extending Gault beyond what it
specifically required, indicating again the tendency of Gault to be
pushed to its logical conclusion. 3 Oklahoma, for example, enacted a
N.Y. FAN. CT. AcT § 724 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
37, § 703-2 (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.171 (Supp. 1971); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 48.29 (Supp. 1971-72).
79. JUVENILE ACT § 16.
80. Paulsen 552.
81. One court has so held. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960). See also
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1402(c) (1971).
82. We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provisions
upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do not even consider
the entire process relating to juvenile "delinquents." For example, we are not here
concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the pre-judicial
stages of the juvenile process. . . .387 U.S. at 13.
83. See notes 21-29 supra and accompanying text. One must be aware, however, that the
states (through legislation as well as court action) tlat have extended Gault represent the
vanguard of a movement to give increased meaning to the emerging juvenile process. Many
states have not answered the lingering questions and have not reached some of the "logical
conclusions" flowing from the Gault decision.
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statute after the Gault decision which provides that information
gained by the questioning of a child is inadmissible unless the
questioning is conducted in the presence of the child's attorney or
legal custodian and only after they have been fully advised of their
constitutional and legal rights, including the right to a trial by jury,
right to counsel, and the right to have counsel appointed by the court
and paid out of the court fund if the party cannot afford one.M Thus,
the Oklahoma statute requires Miranda-type warnings but, oddly
enough, does not provide that the child and his parents be warned of
their right to remain silent85 and that this right may be exercised at
any time. The California statutes provide for full Miranda warnings,
but require, in addition, that the same warnings be given to a juvenile
and his parents by a probation officer if the juvenile is taken before
the probation authority. 5
Although New York's statutory law does not require that
juveniles be given Miranda warnings,81 its courts have held that they
must be warned of their constitutional rights before any questioning
can take place, and have placed great emphasis on the presence or
absence of the parents, particularly where the youths are very young.,
Thus, in a recent case a New York court held inadmissible, statements
made to police after a youth had been given the Miranda warnings in
the absence of his parents.89 A child's confession has also been held
inadmissible after he had been warned of his constitutional rights,
because the court found no effective waiver, the place of
questioning-the police station-was not a statutorily approved place
84. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109(a) (Supp. 1970-71).
85. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,478-79 (1966).
86. CAL. \VELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 625(c), 627.5 (West Supp. 1971).
87. New York does, however, provide that if an officer decides to question a juvenile, the
officer must
take the child to a facility designated by the appropriate appellate division of the supreme
court as a suitable place for the questioning of children and there question him for a
reasonable period of time.. . . N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 724(b)(ii) (McKinney Supp.
1970-71).
The same statute also provides
(d) In determining what is a "reasonable period of time" for questioning a child,
the child's age and the presence or absence of his parents or other person legally
responsible for his care shall be included among the relevant considerations.
Id. § 724(d).
88. See In re Knox, 53 Misc. 2d 889, 280 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Fam. Ct. 1967); In re Rust, 53
Misc. 2d 51, 278 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Fam. Ct. 1967).
89. In re Aaron D., 30 App. Div. 2d 183, 290 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1968). The same result was
reached in an earlier case. In re William L., 29 App. Div. 2d 182,287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1968).
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for questioning juveniles, and the duration of the questioning-eight
hours-exceeded the court's estimate of a "reasonable period of
time.""0 The reasoning underlying these decisions is that, in the
absence of his parents or other persons legally responsible for him,
a youth is incompetent to understand or waive his rights."
Many other courts have also confronted Miranda problems in the
context of the juvenile investigatory process. It has, for example, been
held that Miranda warnings must be given to juveniles during the
investigatory stage of a delinquency proceeding, 2 as well as before
any statements may be taken from the juvenile." It has also been
indicated that in the case of a juvenile more may be required than
merely informing him of his right to counsel and right to remain
silent. 4 With regard to waiver of the juvenile's rights, some courts
have required effective waiver by both the juvenile and his parents,"9
others have said that presence of the parents is unnecessary," and
still others have held that although the presence of parents is not
essential for effective waiver the court will look at the totality of the
circumstances to determine its validity.97
90. In re Nelson, 58 Misc. 2d 748,750, 296 N.Y.S.2d 472,474 (Fain. Ct. 1969).
91. Id. at 752-53.
92. In re Creek, 243 A.2d 49 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
93. In re Teters, 264 Cal. App. 2d 816, 70 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1968); In re Buros, 249 Cal.
App. 2d 55, 57 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1967). Compare In re Acuna, 245 Cal. App. 2d 388, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 884 (1966) with In re Castro, 243 Cal. App. 2d 402, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966). See also
CAL. WELF. & INsT'NS CODE §§ 625, 627.5 (West Supp. 1971), which now require that
juveniles be informed of their constitutional rights (the enumerated rights are similar in tenor
to the Miranda rights) before any questioning may take place.
94. In re Rambeau, 266 Cal. App. 2d 1, 72 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1968). In this case the court
of appeals held a juveniles confession inadmissible because it was taken during a period of
unlawful detention following an illegal arrest, and no attempt had been made to notify the
youth's parents or to bring him without unnecessary delay before a juvenile authority. In
addition, the court found that the questioning of the youth was offensive in nature. The court
seemed to be examining the totality of the circumstances in a way that extends beyond the
usual Miranda inquiry.
95. Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 163 (1969).
96. In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969). In this case,
the youth was a fifteen year-old boy of apparently normal intellect who had had prior encounters
with the law.
97. Lopez v. United States, 399 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1968); West v. United States, 399 F.2d
467 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102 (1969). In both of these cases the youth was
sixteen years old. The West case contains an enumeration of the circumstances to be considered:
(1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both
the substance of the charge, if any has been filed, and the nature of his rights to consult with
an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to
consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before
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This discussion by no means exhausts the consequences of in-
custody treatment,98 but it does amplify the legal requirements that
are being imposed on the treatment of juveniles immediately after
they are brought into custody. It is these requirements, however,
which also cast light on the procedures which should be followed in
the process of deciding whether a juvenile should be taken into
custody. In short, it indicates that the procedures required to be
followed with regard to adults should also be applied to juvenile
offenders.
REFLECTIONS ON THE EMERGING JUVENILE PROCESS
As Gault emphasized, the primary function of the juvenile system
is law enforcement, not, as some may feel, teaching manners to sassy
children. 9 From this point of view, the great majority of jurisdictions
have no special procedures for the handling of young people, in spite
of the fact that juveniles possess unique characteristics that set them
apart from adults."'0 Young people are, in addition, very
impressionable and are particularly vulnerable to influence., When
a youth confronts the police he may feel alone and regard the police
as being demanding, judgmental, and possibly hostile.0 2
Officers who deal with juveniles should be given special training
and experience.1 3 They must know a great deal about youth, about
the problems that young people face, and must be able to recognize
a youth who is in trouble and needs help. Especially where police
are permitted to make the custodial detention decision, these officers
must have at their disposal sufficient knowledge with which to wield
the discretion effectively. Too, the officer ought to be aided, wherever
or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interrogation; (7) length of
interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior
occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later
date. 399 F.2d at 469.
98. For a summary treatment of other custodial problems, such as fingerprinting and search
and seizure, see Ferster & Courtless 589-608.
99. Ketcham, supra note 21, at 1701.
100. Luger, The Youthful Offender, in TASK FORCE REPORT: JUvENILE DELINQUENCY 120-
21.
101. Paulsen 551.
102. Ketcham, supra note 47, at 595.
103. Paulsen 551. See also Swanson 363-70; J. KENNEY & D. PURSUIT, supra note 51, at
43-44. Specialists, however, tend to be "professionalistic." For a discussion of the differences
observed in relations between juveniles and, on the one hand, a "professional" department,
and, on the other, a "nonprofessional" department, see Wilson, The Police and the Delinquent
in Two Cities, in CONTROLLING DELINQUErNTS 9-30.
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possible, by explicit departmental guidelines. While specificity is
desirable, the guidelines must not be so rigid as to deprive the officer
of flexibility in accommodating the great range of street situations.0 4
This discussion, despite efforts to the contrary, indicates that
young people ought to be treated the same as adults in terms of
receiving the protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights, and
because they are different from adults they ought to be handled
differently. This apparent inconsistency poses a Gordian knot of
philosophical and legal entanglements. But it can be unraveled, if
done slowly and perspectively. First it must be remembered that
young people are different-indeed, this is the premise of the original
juvenile court system. In addition, a broad jurisdictional approach
is needed in order to reach the many kinds of problems evidenced
by youth in "trouble." This broad approach is acceptable because
youths need help when they engage in certain kinds of noncriminal
behavior that, because of their young age, is detrimental to what
society determines to be in their best interest or welfare. Yet, when
it comes to initial police intervention in conduct, juveniles ought to
be taken into custody on the street as the result of a police decision
only under the same circumstances in which an adult would be
arrested-that is, for violations of law. Any other jurisdiction that
is to be exercised over juveniles-that is, "protective" jurisdiction,
which owes its existence to the fact that juveniles are different-ought
to be exercised by some authority other than the police. The
permission of that authority should be a prerequisite to police
intervention in the noncriminal conduct of youth, except in an
instance where the child's immediate safety is endangered."°5
The concern is, after all, with deprivation of liberty, which cannot
be accomplished without satisfying the requirements of certain
constitutional safeguards. For it is true, as the Supreme Court said
in Gault, that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone." ' 6 What is therefore required is that
juveniles be accorded the same constitutional protections enjoyed by
adults. Because they are singularly sensitive, impressionable, and
vulnerable in ways that adults are not, they must be handled with a
great deal more solicitude and circumspection. This approach is
104. CommissioN REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 78. See also P. KENNEY & D.
PURSUIT, supra note 51, at 49.
105. See notes 70-74 supra and accompanying text.
106. 387 U.S. at 13.
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consistent with both the underlying concept of parens patriae-the
state as "protector"-and the concept of the emerging "constitu-
tionalized" juvenile process. 17 Gault was indeed revolutionary,' °"
and though some may grumble that the juvenile court has become a
"'miniature criminal court," few voices seriously decry the revolu-
tionary change taking place in the juvenile process.0 9
What is involved in this movement is not a complete abandonment
of an old philosophy but simply a new means of carrying it out:
These challenges to the departure from procedural regularity in the juvenile
courts make the case for bringing juvenile court procedures into closer
harmony with our fundamental commitments to due process of law. What is
entailed is not abandonment of the unique qualities of the juvenile court or
adoption of the precise model of the criminal trial in all its particulars ....
What is entailed is accommodation of both goals by establishing procedures
permitting the court effectively to pursue humane and rehabilitative aims
within the framework of a system that recognizes the indispensability of justice
in any coercive government venture into the lives of individuals." 0
The "coercive governmental venture into the lives of individuals"
begins with the policeman, when he sees a violation of the law or
merely senses that "something is not right" or feels that a youth is
"endangered by his surroundings"-in essence, when state power is
brought to bear against the individual's liberty by an officer's
decision to take a youth into custody."' In some instances the officer
ought not make the decision at all. That power properly belongs-or
should belong-to some other authority, and in 'cases in which the
decision is made by the officer, he ought to be better prepared to
make it.
107. See note 31 supra.
108. Ketcham, supra note 21, at 1718.
109. Though the voices are few, they are heard in high places. See 397 U.S. at 375-76;
387 U.S. at 78-81.
The moment we insist upon affording children-whether in home, school, civic and
legal matters, or court-all constitutional liberties, rights, and safeguards afforded to
adults, we open the door to a number of undesirable, potentially dangerous factors so
that, instead of protecting the child, as is our honest intention, we may be doing him
a disservice, an injustice. Injustice to a child should be unforgivable and unthinkable.
Justice to a child must be more than due process of law and fair legal treatment.
Alexander, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, in JusTIcE 82, 92.
110. TASK FoRCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 31. See also 387 U.S. at 21-22, which
urges that due process is consistent with the philosophical aims of the juvenile court.
I 1l. Police discretion is more fully explored in a conceptualistic manner in Tieger, supra
note 36.
Vol. 1971-9131

